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Focus on Human Resources
Years of research have confirmed the long-held notion that 
the general manager (GM) is fundamental to a hotel’s suc-
cess (e.g., Forte 1986; Mayock 2012; Woods et al. 1998). 
But many contemporary GMs do not have unfettered con-
trol of their property, even though they are formally in 
charge of their hotel (or, more generally, a business unit, per 
Mintzberg 1975), oversee all of their property’s functional 
departments (Nebel and Ghei 1993), and are held account-
able for achieving property-level objectives (Morey and 
Dittman 2003; Woods et al. 1998). Instead, GMs are respon-
sible to hotel owners or to superiors in a corporate manage-
ment firm hierarchy (Corgel, Mandelbaum, and Woodworth 
2011). Given the current hotel structure, a GM’s authority 
to make key property-level decisions will first and foremost 
depend on the level of autonomy the GM is afforded. So far, 
we have seen few studies of the extent of GMs’ autonomy 
or the effects of restrictions on their authority.
In this paper, we use the formulation of autonomy by 
Brooke (1984, 9), which is the extent to which units or sub-
units of an organization “possess the ability to take deci-
sions for themselves on issues which are reserved to a 
higher level in comparable organizations.” More simply, 
autonomy is the degree to which one may make important 
decisions without the consent of others (Brock 2003). The 
reason for this inquiry is the dramatic changes to the owner-
ship and management structures in the hotel industry during 
the last thirty years (Slattery 2012). In many hotel struc-
tures, the GM manages property-level issues according to 
the owner’s or operator’s specifications and achieves the 
objectives of the owner and of the hotel management com-
pany (HMC), if the hotel is operated under a management 
contract. Even small hotels that are owner-operated must 
still meet outside standards if they have a franchise 
arrangement.
Although the GM is an employee of the HMC in hotels 
with a management contract, the relationship between the 
GM and the owner or HMC has many aspects of that of a 
principal and agent, because the manager as an agent can 
potentially act in a way that is not exactly what the principal 
would do (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Anurag Sharma 1997). Given the position’s responsibilities 
and reporting structure, the GM is effectively the primary 
agent acting on behalf of the principals. As such, the owner 
or management firm will be interested in controlling or 
monitoring the GM’s behavior to ensure it is aligned with 
their own interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The GM’s 
autonomy in making decisions for the property is thus sub-
ject to the influence of owners or management companies.
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Understanding the scope and limits of GMs’ decision 
autonomy is an understudied yet important topic for hospi-
tality research. While the greater complexity associated 
with contemporary governance structures in the hotel indus-
try is now widely recognized (e.g., Corgel, Mandelbaum, 
and Woodworth 2011; deRoos and Eyster 2009; Olsen, Tse, 
and West 2008; Singh et al. 2012; Slattery 2012), hospital-
ity research lacks a clear understanding of how these new 
structures have affected the GM’s role, despite the fact that 
the position clearly has changed in recent years (Guerrier 
and Lockwood 1989; Jones and Davies 1991).
We are particularly interested in the level of autonomy 
granted to the GM in different aspects of the hotel opera-
tion. The greater the autonomy, the higher the cost of moni-
toring the GMs’ agent-like behavior (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). But autonomy also has a considerable potential 
value. Substantial research argues that more autonomy is 
better—it can lead to greater creativity (e.g., Liu, Chen, and 
Yao 2011), higher motivation (e.g., Ryan and Deci 2000), 
and improved performance (e.g., Hackman and Oldham 
1976; Morgeson and Humphrey 2008). While certainly the 
empowerment and autonomy of the hotel industry’s front-
line employees and their direct supervisors have been stud-
ied extensively (e.g., Fulford and Enz 1995; Hales and 
Klidas 1998; Jones and Davies 1991; Raub and Robert 
2013), this is not the case for the GM, despite this position’s 
critical role in helping the hotel to succeed. This is also sur-
prising, given what is effectively an agency dilemma, which 
involves the inherent conflict between autonomy as a best 
practice (e.g., Barling, Kelloway, and Iverson 2003; Evans 
and Davis 2005) and the risks of inadequate control (e.g., 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992).
Not surprisingly, the limited research on GMs’ auton-
omy has found contradictory results. One study found that 
GMs have large discretion at work (Dann 1991), while a 
later study found that GMs had a relatively low locus of 
control which was correlated with, but not predicted by, 
self-determination (a construct similar to autonomy; 
Salazar, Pfaffenberg, and Salazar 2006). Another study 
found that the amount of empowerment perceived by the 
GMs was primarily associated with the company rather 
than with individual variables (Jones and Davies 1991). 
Similarly, Takeuchi, Shay, and Li (2008) found that the 
decision autonomy of expatriate hotel GMs was positively 
related to the degree of operational experience of the for-
eign subsidiary. In short, research tells us that autonomy 
can vary across organizations and units and can, at least in 
part, be predicted by individual and organizational charac-
teristics. But beyond this general conclusion, there is little 
consistent insight into how GM autonomy varies and what 
characteristics may predict the level of autonomy that spe-
cific GMs receive.
Returning to the agency dilemma, studies have sup-
ported both greater and smaller levels of GM autonomy. 
Expanding on the arguments we cited above, findings in 
favor of autonomy include GMs’ preference (Worsfold 
1989), reduction of turnover (Birdir 2002) and burnout 
(Kim, Shin, and Umbreit 2007; Ross 1997), and increased 
motivation (Jones and Davies 1991) and job satisfaction 
(Salazar, Pfaffenberg, and Salazar 2006). Beyond the GM, 
autonomy also plays a critical role in employee empower-
ment (Blanchard, Carlos, and Randolph 1999; Kanter 1993; 
Randolph 2000), which is correlated with faster (Bowen 
and Lawler 1995) and better service (Geralis and Terziovski 
2003; He, Murrmann, and Perdue 2010), as well as increased 
customer satisfaction (Bradley and Sparks 2000; Brymer 
1991; Yagil 2006).
The chief argument against GM autonomy is the princi-
pals’ wish to maintain control over their operation. This 
seems to be a current hotel industry trend, as evidenced by 
increasingly higher degrees of centralization (Burgess 
2004). Reduced GM autonomy would mean greater involve-
ment by principals in the hotel’s key decisions. Such 
involvement would reduce the information asymmetry in 
the principal–agent relationships (Anurag Sharma 1997) 
because the principals would have access to the key infor-
mation necessary to make and evaluate the managers’ deci-
sions. This also limits the opportunities GMs have to act in 
their own self-interest, especially in terms of opportunistic 
and risky decisions (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
These studies predict that we should find differences in 
the level of autonomy granted to GMs, depending on a com-
pany’s governance structure, reporting relationships, and 
organizational characteristics, such as its size. Furthermore, 
human capital variables, such as the GM’s skills, experi-
ence, and education, may be considered by owners and 
management companies when delegating decision-making 
autonomy to the GM.
With that background, the purpose of this paper is to 
consider the nature of the modern GM’s role and begin fill-
ing in the knowledge gap about GMs’ decision autonomy 
overallin five functional areas. We investigate the level of 
autonomy that GMs have on operational, human resource, 
marketing, financial, and strategic issues for their properties 
by studying the relative level of involvement of GMs, own-
ers, and management companies in these areas. We also 
compare this autonomy across property sizes and levels of 
GMs’ human capital.
Literature Review
Managerial Functions
As research has shown that a GM’s autonomy can vary 
across functional areas (Vachani 1991), understanding 
that autonomy requires examining the various functional 
roles the GM may play, and thus to what extent a principal 
would wish to limit the autonomy of GMs in these areas. 
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Researchers have divided GMs’ responsibilities into five 
main areas: strategy, operations, marketing, human 
resources, and finance (Aldehayyat 2011; Harper, Brown, 
and Irvine 2005; Ladkin 2002; Nebel and Ghei 1993; 
Nebel, Lee, and Vidakovic 1995; O’Neill 2000; Phillips 
2000). Thus, we consider these five dimensions of auton-
omy as discussed below.
Operations. Most obviously, the GM is the person primarily 
responsible for the hotel’s operations (Ladkin 1999) but 
who also must follow and enforce operating standards and 
procedures (Lenehan 2000). Those operating procedures 
are imposed by the HMC in properties with management 
contracts (O’Neill and Mattila 2010; O’Neill and Xiao 
2006) but that may not be the case in independent hotels, 
depending on their approach to service delivery (Jones and 
Lockwood 2004). Regardless of who sets the standards, 
most GMs have acquired extensive operational experience 
throughout their careers (Harper, Brown, and Irvine 2005). 
We posit that their level of qualification grants them greater 
autonomy.
Human resources. Although management firms have spe-
cific human resources practices, GMs are extensively 
involved in human resource management (HRM) issues. In 
fact, HRM issues are regularly cited as the most troubling 
for both GMs and corporate executives (Enz 2001, 2009). 
Even if the chain mandates strategic HRM practices (Gan-
non, Doherty, and Roper 2012), and even if employee 
selection, training, and development procedures are often 
subject to company-wide policies, most of the staff is hired 
and trained at the unit level (Maxwell and Watson 2006). 
GMs can control their staff only so far, however, since 
supervisors and managers at the unit are often transferred 
across properties as part of corporate development pro-
grams. Independent hotels, meanwhile, are solely responsi-
ble for their own HRM issues, though this is an area where 
owners have been known to involve themselves (Guilding 
2006; Nolan 2002).
Marketing. Most chain operators maintain large regional 
sales efforts and set brand standards. Within that frame-
work, GMs have certain marketing responsibilities and are 
responsible for reaching performance targets. In addition to 
marketing services, management companies are also able to 
offer various distribution services that independent hotels 
may not be able to equal, including proprietary distribution 
channels, yield management systems, and loyalty programs 
(O’Neill and Carlbäck 2011), each of which involves its 
own set of procedures and policies. While independent 
hotels may have variations of these, and though they may 
belong to voluntary chains and marketing consortia to gain 
some of the distribution advantages normally associated 
with chain-affiliated hotels (Holverson and Revaz 2006), 
the GM’s autonomy over marketing decisions may be less 
restricted in these hotels due to the presence of fewer formal 
policies.
Financial matters. Given the critical nature of management 
of revenues and expenses, as well as financing and account-
ing, at the hotel unit level (Singh and Schmidgall 2005), we 
anticipate that the principals would exert considerable con-
trol in this area. The GMs are often responsible for deciding 
how to reach specific financial objectives for their proper-
ties (Harris and Mongiello 2001) but that latitude does not 
necessarily extend to all governance structures. Burgess 
(2004) suggests that HMCs may effectively maintain com-
pany standards by centralizing financial and accounting 
processes at corporate levels and delegating some decision 
making to the property. Even when the GM has a choice of 
financial performance indicators, that selection is often 
influenced by the corporate level in HMC-operated hotels 
(Mongiello and Harris 2006). In addition, the terms of man-
agement contracts typically bind management firms to spe-
cific financial objectives (Eyster 1997). Independent 
properties, meanwhile, are not subject to corporate influ-
ence on financial measures and targets, and thus their GMs 
may have more autonomy on financial issues. Nonetheless, 
given the critical nature of financial outcomes from the 
owner’s perspective, it is likely that autonomy constraints 
will be greater in financial issues than with the operations, 
HR, and marketing responsibilities discussed above. 
Regardless of the corporate structure, the financial skills of 
many GMs have been found to be inadequate (Burgess 
2007; Desouza and Awazu 2004). As such, owners and 
management companies may be reluctant to afford latitude 
to any but the most qualified GMs with regard to financial 
decisions.
Strategy. Studies have been mixed on whether GMs are 
being given greater strategic planning authority (Olsen 
1991), or whether the GMs have experienced declining 
responsibility for strategic decisions (Gilbert and Guerrier 
1997; Hodari and Roper 2009). It appears that GMs in 
HMC-operated hotels are constrained with regard to strat-
egy since they are subject to their parent company’s strate-
gic choices, and thus are not free to make all of their own 
decisions (Ramanathan 2012). Since independent hotels 
lack corporate-level specialists and formal structures 
designed for creating or implementing strategies, however, 
independent hotels may, in fact, rely more on the GM for 
strategic decisions. As with financial matters, this may be 
an area where only those with formal strategic planning 
qualifications may be granted autonomy over such deci-
sions (cf., Harper, Brown, and Irvine 2005).
As we see from this discussion, an overall measure of 
autonomy would be too coarse a construct to depict the 
nature of the hotel GM position. Instead, we anticipate 
436 Cornell Hospitality Quarterly 55(4)
different levels of autonomy based on the five functional 
tasks engaged in by the GM rather than there being one 
overarching factor. Hence, we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 1: GMs’ decision autonomy is determined 
according to functional discipline.
Not only do we expect levels of autonomy to differ by 
functional discipline but we also see likely differences 
according to ownership structure because each hotel is an 
individual entity that must be, at least to some degree, man-
aged as a separate business unit (Nebel and Ghei 1993). The 
GM, under any structure, is responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of the business unit. While external authorities 
may certainly affect the nature of the GM’s position, such 
controls are general and strategic and do not deal with spe-
cific momentary issues. Based on their experience in opera-
tions, marketing, and HR management, and the day-to-day 
demands of these functions, we expect GMs will have more 
discretion in those functional areas than they have for lon-
ger-term or more strategic “big picture” tasks (i.e., finance 
and strategy). Thus, we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 2: GMs have a higher degree of decision 
autonomy on operational, marketing, and human 
resources issues than on financial and strategic issues.
Governance Structures
The ownership and management structure of the hotel—
that is, whether the hotel is independent or HMC oper-
ated—should also affect the GM’s responsibilities and, 
hence, autonomy. The independent hotels we are studying 
are neither affiliated with any brand or chain, nor are they 
operated by one of the independent management companies 
that operate both unbranded and branded hotels on behalf of 
owners. Because independent hotels are largely free to 
operate with fewer imposed restrictions, GMs should have 
relatively high levels of freedom for managing their hotels. 
Of course, even in independent hotels, if the owner is not 
also the GM, we would not expect owners to be completely 
uninvolved in the management of their assets (Birdir 2002). 
We think owners may directly exert influence over prop-
erty-level decisions (e.g., Beals 1995; Eyster 1997; Schlup 
2004). This may especially be the case in luxury hotels due 
to “ego-trip ownership” (Guilding 2006) since such owners 
enjoy being involved in the management of their “trophy 
assets.” Another development in this regard is the rise of 
professional asset managers (Feldman 1995; Singh et al. 
2012), whose expert knowledge and experience are also 
likely to reduce the GM’s autonomy.
However, it seems likely that GMs in hotels operated by 
management firms face a wider range of stakeholders with 
whom they must work and garner support (Brookes and 
Roper 2012). Although management contracts have always 
given the HMCs complete responsibility for a hotel, includ-
ing the “exclusive right to supervise, direct and manage the 
property on behalf of the owner” (Bell 1993, 29), owners 
may nevertheless have some influence, depending on their 
bargaining power as represented in the terms of the man-
agement contract (deRoos 2010). GMs of these properties 
may thus be influenced not only by the HMC but also the 
owner (Gannon, Roper, and Doherty 2010).
We therefore expect independent hotels to employ fewer 
control mechanisms than are found in hotels operated by 
HMCs due in part to the complexities of a management 
contract. First, because management companies operate 
multiple properties, monitoring costs will be reduced due to 
greater efficiencies and economies of scale. Second, in 
HMC-operated hotels, the GM may effectively have two 
principals (Child and Rodrigues 2003), the owner and the 
HMC, thereby requiring more limitations on the GM’s role. 
In contrast, the independent hotel should require the GM to 
perform the widest range of functions, as it has the fewest 
forms of external resources upon which to draw. Thus, we 
predict as follows:
Hypothesis 3: GMs of independent hotels have more 
decision autonomy than GMs of HMC-operated hotels 
on operational, marketing, human resources, financial, 
and strategic issues.
Hotel Size
Researchers have long understood that as organization size 
increases, communication, coordination, and social control 
become more difficult (Child 1972; Khandwalla 1972; 
Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Indeed, one reason that hotels 
are increasingly operated under management contracts is 
the industry’s growing complexity and competitiveness 
(Morrison and Conway 2007). Size adds to complexity, 
which may therefore create more incentives for principals 
to limit managerial autonomy. This in turn increases rigid-
ity as agents redistribute resources to support control func-
tions and rely on increasingly bureaucratic procedures 
rather than on more ad hoc methods (Abemathy, Clark, and 
Kantrow 1983; Ettlie 1983). As a result, larger organiza-
tions often implement administratively oriented control 
through formalized, standardized, and more frequent com-
munication to systematize the information needed for coor-
dination and control purposes (Bruns and Waterhouse 1975; 
Merchant 1981).
Another reason that increased hotel size may mean more 
controls on the GM is that larger hotels represent larger 
investments. With more money at risk, principals will have 
a greater desire to monitor and control their agent’s behav-
iors. An additional reason that GM autonomy may be 
reduced in a large property is the perceived need for more 
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specialization in sales and other functions. As larger hotels 
employ more people, it follows that there would be a greater 
number of HRM issues at these properties, meaning that 
their GMs may be afforded less autonomy in making 
employee-related decisions so as to ensure greater consis-
tency, especially as such hotels can also take advantage of 
economies of scale for HR practices (Way 2002). As well, 
larger hotels experience greater control of their resource 
utilization through more formal planning and monitoring 
(Arun Sharma 2002), which would restrict the autonomy 
provided to these properties’ GMs. In addition, as larger 
hotels are more capital intensive and generate greater sales 
and expenses, owners and HMCs may be less inclined to 
afford GMs high levels of autonomy due to the greater 
financial risks.
Smaller firms, however, generally rely on interpersonal 
control, where the mechanisms used to control, coordinate, 
and communicate are more personal and informal (Bruns 
and Waterhouse 1975). Similarly, owners and managers of 
small firms, who tend to have closer interaction with opera-
tions and employees, are more likely than their counterparts 
in larger organizations to influence management practices 
through their personal preferences and attitudes (Wiesner, 
McDonald, and Banham 2007). Thus, while we expect 
GMs to have greater responsibility in the areas of opera-
tions, HR, and marketing than in finance and strategy 
(Hypothesis 2), and we expect this difference to be moder-
ated in part by the management structure (Hypothesis 3), 
we also believe the difference will be further moderated by 
hotel size. Hence, we predict as follows:
Hypothesis 4: Hotel size will be negatively related to 
GMs’ autonomy across functional areas.
Human Capital
Since agency theory also states that the nature of the agent–
principal relationship is a function of the parties’ bargaining 
power (Jensen and Meckling 1976), we need to examine the 
GM’s human capital. Not only can knowledge, skills, and 
abilities be a source of bargaining power but it is also logi-
cal that a principal would impute more authority to an edu-
cated, experienced GM. A high level of human capital may 
allow a GM to gain more autonomy and that may give the 
GM the capacity to work more effectively in the principal’s 
interests if given more autonomy.
As trained and experienced professionals, GMs possess 
a wide range of knowledge that is specific to their situations 
(Abbott 1988; Anurag Sharma 1997). Anurag Sharma 
(1997) suggests that professionals have higher levels of 
specialized education and experience and often have a great 
deal of autonomy and control over their work. In consider-
ation of this expertise, owners and management companies 
may therefore provide greater degrees of autonomy to hotel 
GMs who have more education and experience. This gives 
the GM a wider range to effectively manage the hotel on 
their behalf, and this broader autonomy also acknowledges 
the GM’s specialized knowledge and experience. In some 
cases, the principals may not be qualified to intervene since 
they do not have this specialized knowledge (Freidson 
1983; Anurag Sharma 1997). GMs who possess greater lev-
els of human capital should, therefore, be capable of main-
taining greater autonomy in their job functions. Hence, we 
hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 5a: GMs’ decision autonomy is positively 
related to their experience.
Hypothesis 5b: GMs’ decision autonomy is positively 
related to their level of education.
Method
Sample
We collected survey data from 115 members of the 
European Hotel Managers Association (EHMA), who are 
GMs of both independent and HMC-operated luxury and 
upper upscale hotels. We sent online surveys to the associa-
tion’s 316 active members, giving them links either to a sur-
vey for GMs of managed properties or of independent 
properties. There were no significant differences in the 
response rate of GMs across the two questionnaires, which 
were identical, save for the reference to either “HMC” or 
“owner” throughout.
The 115 usable responses represent a response rate of 36 
percent, which compares favorably to typical response rates 
in online surveys. For the few questions that some GMs did 
not complete, we imputed a value using maximum-likeli-
hood-based methods, using the JMP software package 
(SAS Institute Inc. 2012). We believe that our relatively 
high response rate is due both to the GMs’ interest in the 
topic and to the fact that these results would be presented at 
the EHMA annual conference. The data were collected in 
March 2011 and presented to and discussed with EHMA 
members the following month.
Measures
Ownership and human capital variables. EHMA members 
were told to consider their hotel to be independent if there 
was no management contract with any company operating 
multiple hotels. Any hotel under management contract 
with a formal business entity that operated multiple hotels 
was classified as HMC operated. Thus, this variable was 
coded as a dummy variable, where independent was the 
base case set to 0, and HMC was set equal to 1. Under this 
rubric, independent hotels made up 44 percent of the 
sample.
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Hotel size, measured by the number of rooms, ranged 
from 14 to 2,230 (median = 180, M = 284, SD = 355). For all 
analyses, we used the log-transformation of the number of 
rooms so as to reduce the leverage of high values and make 
the resulting error term more normally distributed. We also 
noted that independent hotels were notably smaller than 
HMC-operated hotels, as the mean number of rooms for 
independent hotels was 152 (median = 180, SD = 124) ver-
sus 450 for HMC-operated hotels (median = 305, SD = 467).
Human capital was measured by asking respondents 
about their level of experience and education. Both were 
collected as categorical variables, with five categories for 
experience and three for education. The largest group of 
respondents reported experience of eleven to twenty years, 
and a bachelor’s degree was the most common educational 
attainment. Detailed statistics are presented in Exhibit 1.
Decision autonomy. Using questions based on prior autonomy 
research (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Takeuchi et al. 2008), 
responding GMs were asked to assess their influence on deci-
sions related to the five areas of interest: strategy, operations, 
marketing, HR, and finance, using four questions for each. 
Ratings were provided on a Likert-type scale, ranging from 
1, “Decisions taken at corporate level” (“by owner” for inde-
pendent hotels), to 5, “You take the decision.” Coefficient 
alphas of the operations autonomy were .80; the coefficient 
alphas for all the other measures were at or above .90.
Results
To test the hypotheses, we used a combination of struc-
tural equations modeling, t tests, and regression, with the 
summary statistics for the variables reported in Exhibit 1. 
We found that, overall, GMs reported more autonomy 
than our neutral (middle) point of the scale (i.e., all means 
were significantly greater than 3.0 at p < .0001), thus indi-
cating that GMs do, indeed, carry substantial autonomy in 
their position. Nonetheless, the levels of autonomy varied 
notably across respondents (with all of the standard devia-
tions being greater than 1).
Hypothesis 1: Discipline Differences
Our data generally supported Hypothesis 1, which predicted 
that GMs’ decision autonomy is determined according to 
functional discipline rather than being a single overall fac-
tor. To test this, we compared a hypothesized five-factor 
model (where the five autonomy constructs are, indeed, 
separate) to a number of alternative models. Results from 
these confirmatory factor analyses are reported in Exhibit 2.
Compared with the other seven models, the five-factor 
model represented the best fit to the data, significantly bet-
ter than the next-best-fitting model (p < .001). The various 
fit indices show acceptable levels of fit only for the five-
factor model: chi-square per df (χ2/df) = 1.51, Normed Fit 
Index (NFI) = 0.90, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.95, 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) = 0.84, and Root Mean-
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.08. 
Furthermore, all the factor loadings from the items to their 
latent factors were greater than 0.60 and all were significant 
at p < .0001 (see Exhibit 3). Altogether, these analyses sup-
port the view that GMs distinguish between functional areas 
when considering their level of autonomy, supporting 
Hypothesis 1.
Exhibit 1:
Summary Statistics (N = 115).
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Experience 2.68 1.05 —
2. Education 2.09 0.76 −.13 —
3. Number of rooms 284 355 −.16 .01 —
4. Independent versus HMC 0.44 0.50 −.16 .04 .42 —
5. Operations autonomy 3.76 1.05 .29 −.04 −.28 −.45 (.80)
6. Marketing autonomy 4.18 1.10 .21 −.01 −.21 −.37 .75 (.92)
7. Human resource autonomy 4.04 1.10 .17 .03 −.23 −.36 .75 .85 (.90)
8. Financial autonomy 3.47 1.06 .11 .06 −.08 −.08 .68 .65 .65 (.90)
9. Strategic autonomy 3.94 1.11 .05 .03 −.08 .01 .55 .65 .70 .72 (.95)
10. Overall autonomy 3.88 0.94 .19 .02 −.20 −.28 .85 .90 .91 .85 .83
Note. HMC = hotel management company. Correlations of .18 or greater are significant at p < .05. For Independent versus HMC, Independent = 0 
and HMC = 1. The value for number of rooms was log-transformed before any subsequent analyses. The mean and standard deviation reflect the raw 
value, but the correlations and all further analyses are based on the log-transformed value. Experience and education were categorical variables. For 
experience: 1 = less than five years; 2 = six to ten years; 3 = eleven to twenty years; 4 = twenty-one to thirty years; 5 = greater than thirty years. For education: 
1 = less than a bachelor’s degree; 2 = bachelor’s degree; 3 = graduate degree. Coefficient alphas are reported in parentheses on the main diagonal when 
appropriate.
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Hypothesis 2: Greater Scope in Operations, 
Marketing, and HR
Our data partially support Hypothesis 2, but with two unex-
pected twists, as we explain in a moment. With Hypothesis 
1 supported, we continued to Hypothesis 2, which predicted 
that, overall, managers would have higher levels of auton-
omy for operations, marketing, and human resource func-
tions than they would for financial and strategic functions. 
The top portion of Exhibit 4 shows comparisons (and t tests 
of matched pairs’ results) between all of the different 
dimensions of autonomy. These findings reveal mixed sup-
port for Hypothesis 2, due to the unexpected strength of 
strategic autonomy.
First, the results show that, as predicted, these GMs’ 
operations autonomy, marketing autonomy, and human 
resource autonomy are greater than their financial auton-
omy (p < .001 for operations and p < .0001 for marketing 
and human resources). Strategic autonomy, though, was 
higher than hypothesized; only marketing autonomy was 
significantly greater than strategic autonomy (p < .01). Also 
counter to expectations, operations autonomy actually had a 
lower mean than strategic autonomy (mean difference of 
0.18, p < .05).
Some other interesting, non-hypothesized results also 
emerged. We had expected relatively similar levels of 
autonomy for operations, marketing, and human resources. 
What we found, however, were significant differences in 
the average level of autonomy across these three dimen-
sions. Operational autonomy was the lowest of the three 
(with the differences in the means significant at p < .0001), 
Exhibit 2:
GFIs for the Different Models.
Model χ2 χ2/df NFI CFI GFI RMSEA
1. Single-factor 812.01 4.78 0.65 0.70 0.54 0.18
2. Two-factor (a) 586.70 3.47 0.75 0.80 0.65 0.15
3. Two-factor (b) 561.42 3.32 0.76 0.82 0.66 0.14
4. Three-factor (a) 449.43 2.69 0.81 0.87 0.73 0.12
5. Three-factor (b) 568.14 3.40 0.76 0.81 0.66 0.15
6. Four-factor (a) 546.88 3.33 0.77 0.82 0.67 0.15
7. Four-factor (b) 421.67 2.57 0.82 0.88 0.75 0.11
8. Five-factor (hypothesized) 233.54 1.51 0.90 0.95 0.84 0.08
Note. GFI = Goodness-of-Fit Index; NFI = Normed Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Residual Mean-Square Error of Approximation.
Model 1: All factors load on a single latent construct.
Model 2: Construct 1 (operations, marketing, human resource); Construct 2 (financial, strategic).
Model 3: Construct 1 (operations, marketing, human resource, financial); Construct 2 (strategic).
Model 4: Construct 1 (operations, marketing, human resource); Construct 2 (financial); Construct 3 (strategic).
Model 5: Construct 1 (operations); Construct 2 (marketing, human resource); Construct 3 (financial and strategic).
Model 6: Construct 1 (operations); Construct 2 (marketing); Construct 3 (human resource); Construct 4 (financial and strategic).
Model 7: Construct 1 (operations); Construct 2 (marketing, human resource); Construct 3 (financial); Construct 4 (strategic).
Model 8: Construct 1 (operations); Construct 2 (marketing); Construct 3 (human resource); Construct 4 (financial); Construct 5 (strategic).
Exhibit 3:
Factor Loadings for Five-Factor Model.
Construct and Scale Item
Standardized 
Loading
Operations autonomy
Changes in accommodation product 0.67
Changes in Food & Beverage concepts 0.72
Choice of suppliers 0.76
Operating policies and procedure 0.70
Marketing autonomy
Competitor analysis 0.83
Customer expectation analysis 0.84
Distribution channels selection 0.92
Pricing policies 0.90
Human resources autonomy
Compensation policies 0.81
Performance management analysis 0.79
Recruitment and selection policies 0.89
Training and development policies 0.85
Financial autonomy
Capital expenditures 0.80
Cash flow analysis 0.77
Operating budget 0.89
Profit loss analysis 0.87
Strategic autonomy
Property’s goals and objectives 0.99
Property’s opportunities and threats 0.87
Property’s organizational structure 0.91
Property’s strengths and weaknesses 0.88
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while marketing autonomy was the highest (being statisti-
cally greater than human resource autonomy at p < .01).
We also had expected that the levels of financial and 
strategic autonomy would be similar, yet instead found that 
financial autonomy was significantly lower (p < .0001) than 
that of strategy. Altogether, our examination of the means 
across the five autonomy dimensions revealed that there are 
more differences between the levels of autonomy provided 
in the different functional areas than we had originally 
supposed.
Hypothesis 3: Comparing Independent and 
Chain Operations
The picture was also mixed for autonomy in different func-
tions for the two types of hotels. Hypothesis 3 predicted that 
GMs in HMC-operated hotels would have less autonomy 
than those in independent hotels. The lower portion of 
Exhibit 4, which reports the results of t tests comparing 
these two groups, shows that this is the case overall but not 
across all functions. Even though our measure involves the 
five dimensions, we also considered an overall measure of 
autonomy, which combined all of the five measures of the 
various dimensions. Using that measurement, we found that 
GMs in HMC-operated hotels had a lower level of overall 
autonomy than those in independent hotels (p < .001)
However, autonomy varied among the five functions 
taken separately. As we anticipated, compared with GMs in 
independent properties, the GMs in HMC-operated hotels 
had lower autonomy for operations, marketing, and HR (all 
at p < .0001) but that was not the case for financial or stra-
tegic autonomy.
Hypothesis 4: The Effect of Hotel Size
To test the effects of hotel size on the GMs’ autonomy, we 
had to separate the HMC-operated and independent hotels. 
Because the hotel sizes were notably different for the two 
groups, considering both sets of hotels together in the same 
analysis could be problematic. We feared that ownership 
type could be confounded with hotel size and could obscure 
relationships (or create spurious relationships) because of 
the notable mean differences with the autonomy variables. 
Thus, to assess our last two hypotheses, we performed sepa-
rate regression analyses for independent and HMC-operated 
hotels (see Exhibit 5).
Separating the two hotel subsets highlighted differences 
in the relationship of size and autonomy, contrary to the 
Exhibit 4:
Comparison of Autonomy across Dimensions and Governance Structures.
Comparison (Variable 1 compared with Variable 2)
Mean of 
Variable 1
Mean of 
Variable 2 Difference Significance
Comparison of autonomy dimensions
Operations autonomy versus marketing autonomy 3.76 4.18 −0.42 p < .0001
Operations autonomy versus human resource 
autonomy
3.76 4.04 −0.28 p < .0001
Operations autonomy versus financial autonomya 3.76 3.47 0.29 p < .001
Operations autonomy versus strategic autonomya 3.76 3.94 −0.18 p < .05
Marketing autonomy versus human resource 
autonomy
4.18 4.04 0.14 p < .01
Marketing autonomy versus financial autonomya 4.18 3.47 0.71 p < .0001
Marketing autonomy versus strategic autonomya 4.18 3.94 0.24 p < .01
Human resource autonomy versus financial 
autonomya
4.04 3.47 0.57 p < .0001
Human resource autonomy versus strategic 
autonomya
4.04 3.94 0.10 p =.12
Financial autonomy versus strategic autonomy 3.47 3.94 −0.47 p < .0001
Comparison of independent hotels (Variable 1) to HMC-operated hotels (Variable 2)
Operations autonomya 4.17 3.24 0.93 p < .0001
Marketing autonomya 4.54 3.73 0.81 p < .0001
Human resources autonomya 4.38 3.60 0.78 p < .0001
Financial autonomya 3.54 3.38 0.17 p = .21
Strategic autonomya 3.94 3.95 −0.01 p = .52
Overall autonomya 4.11 3.58 0.54 p < .001
Note. HMC = hotel management company. All significance tests are one-tailed.
a. Indicates that a positive difference was hypothesized.
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prediction in Hypothesis 4, which held that hotel size would 
be negatively related to decision autonomy. We find that 
not only do the two hotel types differ with regard to levels 
of autonomy but also the effect of hotel size on autonomy is 
notably different, depending in part on the function in 
question.
First, we found no significant relationship between hotel 
size and GM autonomy in hotels operated by management 
companies, either overall or for any of the dimensions. For 
independent hotels, though, hotel size was significantly 
negatively related to the aggregate measure of overall 
autonomy (p < .05). However, this relationship varied by 
function. Again for independents, hotel size was negatively 
related to autonomy for operations, HR (both at p < .05), 
and marketing (at p < .01). The relationship was marginally 
non-significant for financial autonomy (p < .10), and we 
found no relation for strategic autonomy.
Hypothesis 5: The Importance of Human 
Capital
The effects of human capital on autonomy also diverged 
between the two hotel types. Hypothesis 5 predicted that 
decision autonomy would be positively related to human 
capital characteristics, namely, experience (Hypothesis 5a) 
and education (Hypothesis 5b). As above, we performed 
separate regressions for independent and HMC-operated 
hotels, which revealed different patterns for the effects of 
human capital.
For independent hotels, our results showed consistent 
effects for experience but no main effects for education. 
Greater experience was associated with more autonomy for 
operations (p < .01) and for all four of the other dimensions 
of autonomy (p < .05). Likewise, the relationship of the 
aggregate measure of autonomy with experience was posi-
tive and significant (p < .01). In contrast, there was no rela-
tionship between experience and autonomy for any of the 
individual dimensions or the overall measure in hotels oper-
ated by HMCs.
Since human capital is in reality a product of education 
and experience, we ran a second model that included the 
interaction of these two factors, with intriguing results. 
Once again, we separated independents and HMC-operated 
hotels for these regressions (see Exhibit 6), and both experi-
ence and education were mean centered before the 
interaction.
Although the interaction term was not significant for any 
of the regression models involving independent hotels, we 
saw a clear effect for HMC-operated hotels. The interaction 
term was significant for all five autonomy dimensions (p < 
.05 for strategic autonomy and p < .01 for the other four 
dimensions and the overall measure). This interaction 
Exhibit 5:
Predicting the Level of General Manager Autonomy.
Operations 
Autonomy
Marketing 
Autonomy
Human Resource 
Autonomy
Financial 
Autonomy
Strategic 
Autonomy
Overall 
Autonomy
Independent hotels (N = 64)
 Intercept 4.50
(0.84)****
5.32
(0.71)****
5.45
(0.80)****
3.56
(1.00)***
4.19
(0.73)****
4.60
(0.79)****
 Experience 0.26
(0.11)**
0.31
(0.10)**
0.23
(0.10)*
0.24
(0.13)*
0.22
(0.12)*
0.25
(0.10)**
 Education 0.08
(0.16)
−0.01
(0.16)
−0.01
(0.16)
0.23
(0.19)
0.02
(0.19)
0.06
(0.15)
Ln (N rooms) −0.26
(0.15)*
−0.34
(0.15)*
−0.36
(0.15)**
−0.25
(0.18)†
−0.19
(0.18)
−0.28
(0.14)*
 Model R2 .11 .17 .13 .08 .06 .12
HMC-operated hotels
 Intercept 3.59
(1.08)**
4.36
(1.37)**
3.38
(1.21)**
3.38
(1.21)**
5.39
(1.39)***
4.20
(1.11)***
 Experience 0.21
(0.08)†
−0.03
(0.18)
−0.25
(0.16)
−0.02
(0.16)
−0.22
(0.19)
−0.02
(0.15)
 Education −0.06
(0.16)
0.09
(0.20)
0.00
(0.18)
0.00
(0.18)
0.11
(0.21)
0.06
(0.17)
Ln (N rooms) −0.13
(0.15)
−0.13
(0.19)
0.01
(0.17)
0.01
(0.17)
−0.20
(0.19)
−0.13
(0.15)
 Model R2 .07 .01 .03 .00 .05 .02
Note. HMC = hotel management company. B coefficients are reported in the top of each cell; standard errors are reported in parentheses.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ****p < .0001.
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variable added notable explanatory power, raising the level 
of R-square in the models by .07 in the prediction of strate-
gic autonomy, by more than .10 for operations and market-
ing autonomy, and by roughly .20 for predicting human 
resource and financial autonomy. When looking at the over-
all measure of autonomy, adding the interaction term 
increased the R-square from .02 to .21.
Discussion
These results confirm our opening proposition that auton-
omy is a complex, multidimensional construct for hotel 
GMs, one that varies by the job’s functional duties. While 
GMs do appear to have substantial overall autonomy in 
their position, the level of autonomy depends on the deci-
sion type, the hotel’s governance structure, and the manag-
ers’ own abilities.
With regard to the functional area, we were surprised by 
two of our findings. First, our prediction of lower autonomy 
in strategic issues did not hold true when compared with the 
other functional areas (except for finance, which, as pre-
dicted, did have lower autonomy than for operations, mar-
keting, and human resources). While GMs may have lacked 
experience and training in strategic planning in the past, the 
training and education of GMs have clearly evolved. For 
example, hotel school curricula have increasingly shifted 
from a practical and technical training program to one that 
is more business oriented (Okumus and Wong 2004), and 
strategy courses form a component in many of these 
(Okumus and Wong 2005; Okumus, Wong, and Altinay 
2009). Moreover, this educational evolution could also 
have found its way into corporate management develop-
ment programs and the executive education courses offered 
at academic institutions because the formal training in stra-
tegic planning is increasingly seen as an important skill for 
those wishing to become GMs (Harper, Brown, and Irvine 
2005). With those educational changes, not only may GMs 
be better prepared for these decisions but also their superi-
ors may have the confidence to entrust such decisions to 
them. In addition, competition is largely a local affair, and 
thus the GM may be seen as the best person to take deci-
sions based on knowledge of the competitive market.
The second finding about functional autonomy that sur-
prised us was that the GMs reported having less operational 
autonomy than they possessed in all other areas besides 
finance. We had expected that GMs’ extensive operational 
Exhibit 6:
Predicting the Level of General Manager Autonomy with the Human Capital Interaction.
Operations 
Autonomy
Marketing 
Autonomy
Human Resource 
Autonomy
Financial 
Autonomy
Strategic 
Autonomy
Overall 
Autonomy
Independent hotels
 Intercept 4.50
(0.85)****
5.32
(0.81)****
5.45
(0.81)****
3.56
(1.00)***
4.18
(0.97)****
4.60
(0.79)****
 Experience 0.26
(0.11)*
0.31
(0.10)**
0.23
(0.10)*
0.21
(0.13)*
0.20
(0.13)†
0.24
(0.10)*
 Education 0.08
(0.17)
−0.01
(0.16)
−0.01
(0.16)
0.23
(0.19)
0.01
(0.19)
0.05
(0.16)
Ln (N rooms) −0.26
(0.15)*
−0.34
(0.15)*
−0.36
(0.15)**
−0.22
(0.18)
−0.18
(0.18)
−0.27
(0.15)*
Experience × Education −0.05
(0.17)
0.02
(0.16)
0.00
(0.16)
−0.25
(0.20)
−0.14
(0.19)
−0.08
(0.16)
 Model R2 .11 .17 .13 .11 .06 .13
HMC-operated hotels
 Intercept 3.47
(1.02)**
4.21
(1.30)**
4.06
(1.23)**
3.21
(1.10)**
5.26
(1.35)***
4.04
(1.01)***
 Experience 0.29
(0.14)*
0.07
(0.18)
0.13
(0.17)
0.08
(0.15)
−0.14
(0.19)
0.09
(0.14)
 Education −0.10
(0.15)
0.03
(0.20)
0.10
(0.19)
−0.07
(0.17)
0.06
(0.20)
0.00
(0.15)
Ln (N rooms) −0.12
(0.14)
−0.12
(0.18)
−0.16
(0.17)
0.02
(0.15)
−0.19
(0.19)
−0.11
(0.14)
Experience × Education 0.47
(0.18)**
0.57
(0.23)**
0.78
(0.22)***
0.63
(0.19)**
0.48
(0.24)*
0.59
(0.18)**
 Model R2 .20 .13 .25 .19 .12 .21
Note. HMC = hotel management company. B coefficients are reported in the top of each cell; standard errors are reported in parentheses.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ****p < .0001.
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experience and the sometimes spontaneous nature of opera-
tions would mean that GMs would need greater latitude 
here. Our findings suggest, however, that this is not the 
case. We believe this is in large part a consequence of the 
industry’s intense focus on brand management (O’Neill and 
Mattila 2010), which entails strict operating standards to 
protect brand integrity. While this has long been the case for 
management companies, the shift toward the independent 
hotel owner as an investor who often owns multiple hotels 
could imply that such investors have sought to replicate 
some of the management companies’ advantages by insist-
ing on more top-down policies for operational consistency. 
In addition, operations may not be seen as being as difficult 
as sales and marketing (due to evolving technological 
advancements) or as delicate as HR issues (due to legal 
ramifications), and therefore could be an area where owners 
feel more able to involve themselves even though they lack 
specialized knowledge or experience.
As predicted, we found that GMs in HMC-operated 
hotels have lower autonomy in operations, marketing, and 
HR management than those in independent properties. We 
did not, however, find that the same held true for strategy 
and finance, neither of which was dependent on the gover-
nance structure. This finding may call for a revision of the 
view that independent hotels lack strategic planning prac-
tices (Amit Sharma 2008). We think that principals, be they 
independent owners or management companies, prefer to 
remain more involved in financial and strategic issues since 
these are key value-adding functions that they can provide. 
Institutional owners are often professional real estate invest-
ment groups with strong resources and professional man-
agement know-how, including asset managers (Ambrose et 
al. 2000; Woolley et al. 1997). As these investors often also 
have specific and short-term investment horizons for their 
properties, they may be more involved in strategic and 
financial decisions, and thus may mirror the policies and 
involvement levels of the HMCs. The same may be true for 
individual owners since the fact that they own a hotel means 
they are entrepreneurial, think strategically, and may see it 
as their responsibility to oversee their investment’s direc-
tion. It may also be that GMs are still largely seen as more 
operational than business oriented, and as such may still be 
regarded by the principals as innkeepers rather than busi-
ness directors. If that is the case, such managers would be 
subjected to the involvement of the principals in these 
“business” areas regardless of the governance structure.
The different effects of organizational size for indepen-
dent and HMC-operated hotels were also interesting. 
Management firms seem to be consistent in terms of GM 
autonomy regardless of their hotel’s size, and they use other 
criteria for autonomy considerations. In independent hotels, 
however, size mattered; GMs’ autonomy declined as the 
size of the independent hotels increased. As we mentioned 
above, we believe that owners of independent hotels are 
less willing to delegate authority as their investment 
increases.
The effects associated with human capital also varied for 
the two hotel types. Independent hotels provided more 
autonomy for GMs who had more experience but not those 
with more education. In contrast, neither education nor 
experience alone mattered in HMC-operated hotels, but a 
manager who combined experience and education was 
given higher levels of autonomy in all areas. Thus, one can-
not make general statements about how the industry values 
education or experience in its GMs. Our results show that 
independent hotels seem to value experience but not educa-
tion. In contrast, HMCs recognize the benefit of the combi-
nation of education and experience.
Managerial Implications
Our results demonstrate that the differences in various 
GMs’ decision autonomy may reside as much with a par-
ticular GM’s human capital as with a hotel’s ownership and 
management structures. GMs may benefit from continuing 
education, but only in HMC-operated hotels, and only if the 
manager has the requisite experience to match. In indepen-
dent hotels, it is only experience that appears to lead to 
higher levels of autonomy, regardless of education.
Given that lower autonomy has been associated with 
greater job burnout in the hotel industry (Kim, Shin, and 
Umbreit 2007), choices about education and training could 
have important career implications. Moreover, both man-
agement companies and owners may find a better fit with 
GMs whose aspirations toward autonomy align with their 
own philosophies regarding decentralization and empower-
ment. One clear implication is for realistic recruitment 
whereby owners and management companies may consider 
discussing expected autonomy levels with prospective 
GMs.
Individuals seeking to attain the role of GM, which has 
often been described as a “target job” (e.g., Ladkin 1999), 
may also benefit from focusing on the traditional areas of 
operations, marketing, and HR since these appear to be the 
areas in which owners and HMCs expect their GMs to focus 
and excel. We do not suggest that finance and strategy are 
unimportant for the hotel or the GM’s career (especially 
since strategy seems to be gaining in importance), but only 
that skills in these areas may not be the deciding factor for 
attaining the GM position. Those seeking to become GMs 
may want to consider whether their career path will bring 
them to independent or HMC-operated hotels. GMs who 
work for HMCs or who feel they may pursue jobs in HMC-
operated hotels are also encouraged to gain advanced 
degrees if they also wish to improve their chances for being 
given autonomy. Alternatively, GMs with extensive experi-
ence but limited education may want to seek employment 
specifically at independent hotels.
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Contributions, Limitations, and Suggestions for 
Future Research
Research about managerial work in the hospitality industry 
has almost always been restricted to the United States and 
has so far largely been inconclusive due to its predomi-
nantly exploratory, qualitative nature (e.g., Gannon, Roper, 
and Doherty 2010) and the small numbers of the studies’ 
participants (e.g., Arnaldo 1981; Dann 1991; Ley 1980). 
Similarly, studies about hospitality industry managers’ 
activities have generally sampled from a variety of industry 
sectors, functional levels, and departments (e.g., Gamble, 
Lockwood, and Messenger 1994; Kay and Russette 2000), 
thereby preventing any significant analysis about hotel 
GMs in particular. Furthermore, most research on GMs 
either predates or ignores the implications of different gov-
ernance structures, although researchers largely agree that 
the involvement of HMCs and owners in property-level 
decisions has not yet received enough attention (Gannon, 
Roper, and Doherty 2010; Turner and Guilding 2010). This 
study sought, in part, to remedy these knowledge gaps, and 
thus focused on GMs of European hotels.
As with any research, though, our study’s results should 
be interpreted with caution. First, our sample comprised 
one set of GMs who demonstrate commitment to their 
careers and industry by belonging to the invitation-only 
EHMA, which caters to GMs of upscale and luxury proper-
ties. Therefore, the findings may not necessarily generalize 
to all GMs, especially to those operating midscale, econ-
omy, or budget hotels. Similarly, as our sample was limited 
to GMs in Europe, we cannot assume that the findings gen-
eralize to other locations.
Because we collected the data through one source, we 
risk common method variance (CMV), although our analy-
sis sought to control CMV to the extent possible. We did 
find divergent validity in our constructs, as Hypothesis 1 
was strongly supported against a variety of alternative mod-
els. Furthermore, the regressions contained multiple inde-
pendent variables that reduce the effect of any possible 
CMV (Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira 2010). Finally, CMV 
would have made the separate regression results more simi-
lar, rather than having just notable differences between the 
independent and HMC-operated samples. Thus, we feel the 
potential risks of CMV are minimal.
Our findings also indicate several interesting opportuni-
ties for applied business research. First, because the two 
ownership structures we studied have such an impact on 
both the level of and relationships with GM decision auton-
omy, future research should delve more deeply into ques-
tions about the operating implications of ownership 
structure. While this study examines antecedents of dimen-
sions of autonomy, research examining the implications of 
autonomy would have critical implications for practice. 
Future research should examine the extent to which GM 
autonomy improves organizational performance (e.g., cus-
tomer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, and financial 
measures). Second, because owners are increasingly using 
asset managers to oversee the performance of their indepen-
dent and HMC-operated hotels, it could be useful to com-
pare the relative influence of owners and asset managers on 
property-level decisions. Although asset managers are 
increasingly important for portfolio management, we have 
seen few studies regarding their effects on operational and 
financial performance (Singh et al. 2012). The way asset 
managers change the nature of the GM’s work (if, indeed, 
they even do) would give organizations and owners better 
information as to what sort of effect employing an asset 
manager will have. Given the importance of the GM’s posi-
tion, we recommend that research on autonomy should con-
tinue, and further examination of the specific consequences 
of GMs’ autonomy in the hospitality industry would be par-
ticularly valuable.
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